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The Automatic Companion Rule: A Bright Line Standard
for the Terry Frisk of an Arrestee's Companion
In United States v. Flett,' the Eighth Circuit held that courts should
use a totality of the circumstances test, not an automatic per se rule,
when determining whether police may frisk the companion of a suspect
arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant.2 The Eighth Circuit thus re-
fused to join the Fourth,3 Seventh, 4 and Ninth5 Circuits, which have
adopted the "automatic companion" rule-a doctrine which allows an
automatic frisk for weapons of a companion of an arrestee. 6 Instead, the
court stated that the automatic companion rule is directly opposed to the
Supreme Court's direction in Terry v. Ohio7 and Ybarra v. Illinois" that po-
lice officers have an "articulable suspicion" that an individual is armed
and dangerous before they frisk him.9
Part I of this note discusses the Supreme Court's holding in Terry v.
Ohio and considers whether it can be reconciled with the automatic com-
panion rule. Part II examines the split in the circuits concerning the
adoption of the automatic companion rule. Part III focuses on Supreme
Court cases that provide guidance as to the adoption of the rule. Finally,
Part IV concludes that the courts should adopt the automatic companion
rule.
I. Terry and the Automatic Companion Rule
The automatic companion rule allows police to conduct a pat-down
search for weapons of the companion of an arrestee if the police possess
an arrest warrant for the suspect and the companion is capable of in-
flicting harm on the arresting officer.10 The court in Flett rejected this
rule, reasoning that it runs counter to the Supreme Court's holding in
1 806 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1986).
2 Id. at 827.
3 United States v. Poris, 484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973).
4 United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977).
5 United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971).
6 See infra note 10.
7 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
8 444 U.S. 85 (1979). See also infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
9 806 F.2d at 827. See also United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejected auto-
matic companion rule), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 155 (1985).
10 The automatic companion rule was first adopted in United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189
(9th Cir. 1971).
All companions of the arrestee within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a
harmful assault on the officer, are constitutionally subjected to the cursory "pat-down" rea-
sonably necessary to give assurance that they are unarmed.
Id. at 1193.
An inherent conflict exists between the terms "automatic" and "capable of inflicting harm."
The latter term seems to indicate that the the police officer has to meet some type of standard before
searching whereas the former term indicates that the search is per se reasonable. Logically, the term
"capable of inflicting harm" seems to imply a simple physical ability threshold. No court that has
adopted the automatic companion rule has indicated that the officer comply with any standard of
suspicion with respect to the companion.
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Terry v. Ohio 1 that any search of an individual must be made pursuant to
articulable suspicion.12
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. 13 The warrant clause of the fourth amendment requires that
probable cause exist before an officer can obtain a warrant to search
either a person or his property. Courts have recognized very few excep-
tions to the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. The automatic
companion rule constitutes one such exception. The Supreme Court
enunciated another warrant-clause exception for limited pat-down
searches in Terry v. Ohio, 14 the "stop and frisk" case.
The Court first noted that the term "stop and frisk" was a misnomer.
The stop and frisk involved in Teny was a search and seizure within the
fourth amendment.1 5 The Court held that this search and seizure was
11 See infra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
12 The Eighth Circuit in Fltt stated that the automatic companion rule "appears to be in direct
opposition to the Supreme Court's directions in both Terry and Ybarra that the officers articulate
specific facts justifying the suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. We decline to adopt
the 'automatic companion' rule." 806 F.2d at 827.
13 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, Officer Martin McFadden, while patrolling downtown Cleveland
in plain clothes, spotted two men standing on a comer. Not knowing why he noticed these men,
McFadden testified that, after 39 years of experience, he had developed routine habits of observa-
tion, and that these two men "didn't look right" to him at the time. He continued observing the
men's movements.
Officer McFadden suspected that the two men were "casing a job, a stick-up." After the two
suspects joined another man, Officer McFadden approached the three men and identified himself as
a police officer. When McFadden asked for their names, the three men just "mumbled something."
McFadden immediately grabbed one of the men and patted down the outside of his clothing. Mc-
Fadden felt a pistol and removed it. He proceeded to pat down the other two men and found a
revolver on one of them. Id. at 5-7.
15 It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person. And it is nothing less than sheer
torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of
a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a "search."
Id. at 16. Note that the Court held that this intrusion was "something less than a 'full' search, even
though it remains a serious intrusion." Id. at 26. The Court allowed a pat-down search to proceed
without a warrant by recognizing the "distinction in purpose, character, and extent between a search
incident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons" and that a limited pat-down search must "be
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation." Id. at 25-26.
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, insisted that the Court had missed a step in its reasoning.
Harlan contended that in order to frisk someone, the officer must first have the constitutional right
to forcibly stop someone. Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring). The constitutionality of the stop de-
pends upon its reasonableness. Harlan concluded that once a reasonable stop occurs, "the right to
frisk must be immediate and automatic .... There is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly
confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and take the risk
that the answer might be a bullet." Id. at 33.
The Court has struggled with the question of when a seizure actually takes place. In United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), the Court, in examining the approach and questioning of
an airline passenger in a terminal, split several ways on the issue of whether or not a seizure had
occurred. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concluded that no seizure took place. The
test applied by Stewart would find that a seizure has taken place only if a "reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave." Ii- at 554. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, did not reach the "extremely close" issue of whether a seizure oc-
curred. Rather, they assumed that a seizure had occurred, and found it to be reasonable under the
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valid without a warrant,1 6 and was valid even on a showing of less than
probable cause.' 7 To satisfy the fourth amendment, the police officer
must "be able to point to specific and articulable facts" that warranted
the intrusion.1 8
The underlying rationale of Terry is relevant to the automatic com-
panion rule. The Terry Court first considered the application of the ex-
clusionary rule. 19 The Court stated that the major thrust of the
exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. 20 The Court noted
that the exclusionary rule has its limitations. The exclusionary rule is no
deterrent when an officer has another motive aside from arrest; in Terry,
the other motive was safety.21 The officer who fears for his safety is not
concerned with the admissibility of evidence found pursuant to a pat-
down search. Instead, the officer is protecting himself and those around
him by conducting a pat-down search for weapons. 22
circumstances. Id. at 565 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and Stevens, disagreed with Justice Stewart's reasoning but did not resolve the initial seizure
issue because it was not properly raised in the lower courts. Id. at 568-70 (White, J., dissenting).
16 The Court noted that the police conduct involved here was "necessarily swift action predi-
cated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat" and that it historically has never
been, nor could it be, subject to the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. 392 U.S. at 20.
17 The Court held:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id. at 30.
18 Id at 21.
19 The exclusionary rule excludes evidence which is the product of an illegal search or seizure.
It was first adopted by the federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and was
later held to apply to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20 "Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct." 392
U.S. at 12. See also LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in a Imperfect World On Drawing "Bright Lines" and
"Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 307 (1982). LaFave cites Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960), which states that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it." LaFave, supra, at 317. But see Allen, The Judicial Quest for PenalJustice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, where Professor Allen concludes that "the case for the rule as
an effective deterrent of police misbehavior has proved, at best, to be an uneasy one." Id. at 537. See
generally Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond- The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclu-
sionaty Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).
21 The exclusionary rule is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either
have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest
of serving some other goal.... [A] rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary
rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may
exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.
392 U.S. at 14-15.
22 When a police officer is carrying out the governmental interest of investigating crime,
there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpect-
edly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that
police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. American
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Similarly, the motive behind the automatic frisk of an arrestee's com-
panion is also safety. Thus, any objection to the automatic companion
rule based on unreasonably seized evidence becomes irrelevant. The of-
ficer's frisk of the companion is a defensive measure, designed to protect;
it is not an offensive move directed toward prosecution. The Court in
Terry recognized this conflict and fashioned a warrant-clause exception
because of it. The companion frisk is another such exception.
II. Conflict in the Circuits
Five circuits have applied Terry's analysis in considering the adoption
of the automatic companion rule. The Eighth Circuit applied the Terry
analysis in the Flett opinion.23 In Flett, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA) requested and received an arrest warrant for Steve
Jacobson, a member of a local gang known as the Sons of Silence.2 4
When the BCA officer entered Jacobson's home to arrest him, the de-
fendant, a friend of Jacobson's, and the defendant's wife were present.2 5
Almost immediately upon entry, Deputy Adams of the BCA asked the
defendant to stand and conducted a pat-down search.26 The pat-down
search of the defendant uncovered a buck knife and a derringer pistol.2 7
The Eighth Circuit, in upholding the search on Terry grounds, re-
jected the automatic companion rule.28 The court relied on Ybarra v. Illi-
nois,2 9 which stressed the narrow scope of the Terry exception.3 0 The
court stressed that both Ybarra and Terry required articulable suspicion
that the person to be frisked was dangerous. 31
The Flett court adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Bell.3 2 In Bell, the appellate court also rejected the automatic
companion rule and likewise stressed the narrow scope of the Terry ex-
ception. 33 The court feared that the automatic companion rule would
encourage guilt by association as a rule.34
criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law
enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded.
Id. at 23.
23 806 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1986).
24 The police knew "that in general the members of the Sons of Silence had access to and had
used weapons in the past." Id at 824.
25 Conflicting evidence existed concerning whether the officers demanded to be let in or
whetherJacobson consented. The court considered the entry valid due to consent. Id. at 825.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. But see United States v. Clark, 754 F.2d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v.
Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971), the court asserted that officers have "a right to protect
themselves from the use of any firearms that might be available.")
29 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
30 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
31 See supra note 17 and infra note 42.
32 762 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1985).
33 "An automatic companion rule is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's observation that it
'has been careful to maintain [the] narrow scope' of Terry's exception to the warrant requirement."
Id. at 499 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)).
34 "[W]e do not believe that the Terry requirement of reasonable suspicion under the circum-
stances has been eroded to the point that an individual may be frisked based upon nothing more
than an unfortunate choice of associates." Id.
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The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits adopted the automatic
companion rule in United States v. Poms, United States v. Simmons, and United
States v. Beryhill, respectively.3 5 The Ninth Circuit was the first to adopt
the automatic companion rule. The underlying rationale of the court's
decision was twofold: Safety of the officer and the assertion that com-
mon sense would allow an officer to pat-down a companion of an arres-
tee.36 The courts in Poms and Simmons accepted the reasoning of Berryhill
and adopted the automatic companion rule.3 7
III. Supreme Court Guidance
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitu-
tionality of an automatic companion rule,38 the circiits have relied upon
several Supreme Court cases to support the rejection of the automatic
companion rule. Other Supreme Court cases have articulated reasoning
which should affect the validity of the automatic companion rule.
The Flett court held that the automatic companion rule is in "direct
opposition to the Supreme Court's directions in ... Ybarra that the of-
ficers articulate specific facts justifying the suspicion that an individual is
armed and dangerous." 3 9 In Ybarra v. Illinois,40 the Court found the cur-
sory pat-down of all customers of a tavern unconstitutional, even though
the police had a search warrant for the tavern and for its bartender.41
The Court rejected the state's assertion that the pat-downs were valid
Terry searches. The Court stressed the narrow scope of Terry and held
that simple presence on the premises-even premises for which authori-
ties possess a search warrant-is not enough for a Terry search.42 The
35 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
36 The court in Berryhill stated:
We think that Terry recognizes and common sense dictates that the legality of such a limited
intrusion into a citizen's personal privacy extends to a criminal's companions at the time of
arrest. It is inconceivable that a peace officer effecting a lawfil arrest of an occupant of a
vehicle must expose himself to a shot in the back from defendant's associate because he
cannot, on the spot, make the nice distinction between whether the other is a companion in
crime or a social acquaintance.
445 F.2d at 1193.
Note that Teny would seem to reject the "such a limited intrusion" language of Berryhill by
calling the pat-down a "severe ... intrusion upon cherished personal security .... 392 U.S. at 24-25
(emphasis added). The Court continued: "It is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure per-
formed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his
hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person .... 392
U.S. at 16-17.
37 For a more detailed look into the facts and the history of these cases, see Comment, United
States v. Bell: Rejecting Guilt by Association in Search and Seizure Cases, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 258
(1986).
38 "The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the applicability of the Terry exception to a
search of the companion of an arrestee." United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1986).
39 Id at 827.
40 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
41 In Ybarra, the police obtained a search warrant for the premises of a tavern and a search
warrant for its bartender. Upon entering the tavern, the police advised everyone that they were
going to conduct a cursory pat-down of all customers for weapons. When the police patted down
the defendant Ybarra, a customer in the tavern, they felt "a cigarette pack with objects in it." The
officer continued his search of the other customers and then returned to the defendant. The officer
frisked the defendant again, removed the cigarette pack, and found six tinfoil packets containing
heroin. Id at 87-89.
42 The Court stated:
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police officer must have independent articulable suspicion for every per-
son that is frisked.43
Ybarra's own language, however, removes it from the automatic com-
panion controversy. The Court spoke in terms of people who "happen
to be on the premises" and "generalized searches," and thus was not
concerned with the search of a "companion." A companion is a person
who accompanies another; a person who is an associate or comrade.44
Certainly patrons in a bar are not necessarily associates or comrades.
Ybarra dealt with people who were completely independent of the person
being searched. This type of search does not fall under the automatic
companion rule.
The Ybarra case also relies on United States v. Di Re 45 in its analysis.
In Di Re, the Court refused to uphold the search of the defendant Di Re,
who was seated in the car next to the validly arrested suspect.46 The
Court reasoned that a person, by mere presence in the car of an arrested
suspect, does not lose immunities from a personal search to which he
otherwise would be entitled. 47 Di Re is not relevant to the automatic
companion rule for two reasons. First, no warrant existed for the initially
arrested suspect; for the automatic companion rule to apply, the authori-
ties must obtain an arrest warrant for the original suspect.48 Second, Di
Re dealt with a thorough search of the companion for evidence;49 the auto-
matic companion rule simply allows a cursory pat-down of a person for
weapons for the officer's safety.50
The rationale of several Supreme Court cases, though not dealing
with the automatic companion rule directly, helps to determine the con-
stitutional validity of the automatic companion rule. In Chimel v. Califor-
nia,5' the Supreme Court held that even pursuant to a valid arrest, a
Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized "cursory search for weapons" or,
indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons. The "narrow scope" of the Terry
exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion
directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on the premises
where an authorized search is taking place.
Id. at 93-94 (emphasis added).
43 Id. at 94.
44 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 461 (1966).
45 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
46 In Di Re, police officers validly arrested the driver of an automobile. They took the defendant,
a passenger in the car, into custody, and frisked him. At the police station, an officer searched the
defendant and found counterfeit gasoline and fuel oil ration coupons on his person. After two hours
of questioning, the police booked and thoroughly searched him. The officer found one hundred
counterfeit inventory gasoline ration coupons on his body, hidden in an envelope. Id. at 583.
47 Id. at 587.
48 Id. at 582-83. It is not clear from the language in United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189
(9th. Cir. 1971), that the automatic companion rule only applies to a companion of a person arrested
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. See supra note 10. This note deals only with the warrant situation.
49 332 U.S. at 583.
50 See supra note 10.
51 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, three police officers arrived at defendant's home with an
arrest warrant. The defendant was not home but his wife allowed the officers to enter and wait.
When the defendant arrived, the police officers arrested him and asked for permission to look
around. The defendant objected, but the officers advised him that they could conduct a search pur-
suant to the lawful arrest. The officers searched the house, including furniture drawers in the master
bedroom and the sewing room. The officers found fruits of the burglary for which the defendant was
arrested. Id. at 753-54.
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search of the arrestee's entire house cannot be constitutionally justi-
fied.5 2 The Court held that, after a valid arrest, the police can search the
suspect and also search the "area within his immediate control.153 This
has become known as the "wing span" rule.54
It is clear that the overriding justification for a Chimel search is
safety.5 5 The police are allowed to search an area for which they have no
warrant because of safety concerns for the police officer.5 6 The wingspan
rule, in allowing warrantless searches, recognizes that safety concerns
may override the fourth amendment concerns of freedom from personal
intrusion.5 7
In United States v. Robinson,58 the Supreme Court held that the search
of a person incident to a valid arrest is per se reasonable.5 9 The Court,
as it did in Chimel, stressed the safety factor. The Court noted that the
nature of the crime is immaterial; all arrests are potentially dangerous.6 0
52 Id. at 768.
53 The Court reasoned that:
[I~t is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on
the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of
course, be governed by a like rule.
Id. at 763.
54 See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 738 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984).
55 The Court noted that "[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be
as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested." 395
U.S. at 763. See Joseph, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Protecting Arresting Officers From Attack by Persons
Other than the Arrestee, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 95 (1983), which discusses the protective sweep doctrine.
The protective sweep doctrine would allow police officers to conduct a limited search of a premises
for other persons to assure the officer's safety following a lawful arrest. Professor Joseph believes
that Chimel does not preclude this type of search. Joseph concludes that "Chimel indicates that the
major reason for upholding such a search is the Court's strong concern for the safety of the arresting
officers" and the decision "suggests a willingness on the part of the Court to consider a broader
right to search when it is conducted as a precaution for the safety of the arresting officers." IM at
100.
56 Joseph, supra note 55, at 100. The distinction between searching objects and persons is not
apparent. See S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1980), where the author concludes:
mhe [Fourth] Amendment covers searches and seizures of "persons, houses, papers, and
effects," and draws no apparent line between persons and objects. That no distinction was
intended is a proposition that finds some support also in the final six words of the amend-
ment. Yet, the cases reveal important differences between the treatment of arrests of peo-
ple and concomitant searches on the one hand, and searches and seizures of places and
things on the other hand. Surprisingly, the person often gets less protection than his
property.
id at 33.
57 The Court did address the defendant's argument that police can search a person's home sim-
ply by "arranging to arrest suspects at home rather than elsewhere." The Court refused to acknowl-
edge that the officer used this strategy in this case. 395 U.S. at 767.
58 414 U.S. 218 (1973). In Robinson, a police officer arrested the defendant for "operating [a
vehicle] after revocation [of his license] and obtaining a permit by misrepresentation." The officer
proceeded to fully search the defendant and found, crumpled in a cigarette pack, 14 gelatin capsules
of heroin. Id, at 220-23.
59 The Court held that if the initial intrusion, the arrest, is lawful, "a search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority
to search ...... Id. at 235.
60 The Court refused to accept that "persons arrested for the offense of driving while their
licenses have been revoked are less likely to possess dangerous weapons than are those arrested for
other crimes." Id, at 234.
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The Court hinted that safety may be the key reason for any search.61
Robinson dealt with the search of an individual; Chimel dealt with the
search of the area within reach of the validly arrested suspect. In both
cases, the Court allowed the searches in order to protect the arresting
officer(s). 62 The automatic companion rule accomplishes the same pur-
pose. When a person is validly arrested, the officer should be allowed,
for his own safety, to perform a limited pat-down of a companion.
In Michigan v. Summers, 63 the Supreme Court held that police officers
can detain persons on the premises while a search pursuant to a warrant
is executed. 64 The Court again stressed safety when it stated that the
"execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction
that may give rise to sudden violence .... [T]he risk of harm to both the
police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise
unquestioned command of the situation."' 65 The police in this case had
no evidence against the detained people, yet the Court held that a search
warrant was enough to detain them. In the automatic companion case
the officer would also minimize "the risk of harm to both police and oc-
cupants" by taking "unquestioned command of the situation. 66
IV. Adoption of the Automatic Companion Rule
Various Supreme Court cases thus support the adoption of the auto-
matic companion rule by emphasizing the same underlying rationale:
Safety.67 This is the first of three reasons supporting the adoption of the
automatic companion rule. A police officer's need for clear guidance and
common sense also call for the adoption of the rule.
A. Safety of Police Officers, Citizens, and Bystanders
If safety is the underlying rationale of the automatic companion rule,
a police officer who arrests a suspect should be allowed to frisk his com-
panion.68 A recent study69 emphasized the dangers of arresting suspects.
61 The Court further noted the safety aspects by stating that "[t]hejustification or reason for the
authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect
in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later
use at trial." Id. at 234.
62 "The Robinson and Chimel cases, taken together, indicate that a concern for an officer's safety
as he makes a lawful custodial arrest justifies a narrowly defined search." Joseph, supra note 55, at
101-02.
63 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
64 Id. at 704-05. The Court stressed that the people who were allowed to leave would likely flee.
Id. at 702.
65 Id. at 702-03.
66 The risk of harm to everyone involved will be decreased by the automatic companion rule. See
infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
67 The circuits adopting the automatic companion rule have not relied on any of these Supreme
Court cases. The sole Supreme Court case relied on in adopting the automatic companion rule is
Teny v. Ohio. See United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 318-20 (7th Cir. 1977), United States v.
Poms, 484 F.2d 919,920-21 (4th Cir. 1973), and United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th
Cir. 1971).
68 See Benyhill, 445 F.2d at 1193.
69 S. CHAPMAN, Cops, KILLERS AND STAYING ALIVE: THE MURDER OF POLICE OFFICERS IN
AMERICA (1986). Chapman compared the murder of police officers in Oklahoma with national statis-
tics, which he derived from two sources, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports and Law Enforcement
Officers Killed and Assaulted.
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Approximately twenty-three percent of all law enforcement officers killed
during the years 1965-84 were killed while attempting arrests. 70 This
statistic substantiates Justice Rehnquist's concern regarding the inherent
dangers of an arrest expressed in his Robinson opinion.71
In police-citizen encounters, there are dangers for citizens as well as
police. In a 1981 study of Chicago police shootings, 72 the authors found
that "a sizeable number of shootings by police officers seem to be avoida-
ble."73 The study revealed that ten percent of all shootings were acci-
dental; three percent by stray bullet; and one percent because of
mistaken identity. Therefore, fourteen percent of all shootings by police
officers can be considered accidental. 74 The automatic companion rule
would serve to reduce these shootings, 75 as well as police deaths.
B. "Bright Line" Guidance
The Supreme Court recognized the need for guidance in the area of
search and seizure by enunciating a "bright line" standard in New York v.
Belton.76 The Court reasoned that bright line standards will enhance
fourth amendment protections, not hinder them.77 Commentators in the
70 S. CHAPMAN, supra note 69, at 9. This figure excludes arrests for burglaries and robberies.
Those arrests are grouped into categories of being killed "while burglaries and robberies are in
progress" and "while pursuing robbery suspects." These categories are not relevant to the issue.
The 23% figure does not reveal who killed the police officer. Chapman's study also reveals that of
the fifteen police officers killed in Oklahoma during the years 1950-84 while attempting arrests, 11 of
the slain officers were "in the presence of at least one other officer and, in some cases, many others."
Id. at 11. This indicates that arrests are extremely dangerous regardless of the number of law en-
forcement officers present.
71 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in Terry also recognized
the dangers of dealing with criminals in the United States by emphasizing the easy access to firearms
in this country and stated that "this fact is relevant to an assessment of the need for some form of
self-protective search power." 392 U.S. at 24 n.21.
72 Geller & Karales, Split-SecondDecision, Shootings ofandby Chicago Police, 12 CXU.Jusr. NEwsL. 3
(June 8, 1981). The study utilizes shootings data for the years 1974-78 which include the files of the
internal investigative department of the Chicago Police Department. The authors write that this is
"the first time a major American police department has voluntarily opened its internal investigative
files on police-involved shootings to persons outside the official law enforcement system." Id
73 The authors cite as reasons for accidental shootings "poor gun handling habits (carrying
cocked revolvers .... etc.) ... and civilian conduct which does not immediately jeopardize the lives
of officers or the public (nonviolent flight being a prime example)." Id. at 4.
74 No data is available as to how many of the 14% were companions of an arrestee.
75 It is a fair assumption that an officer's apprehension during an arrest/search situation caused
some of these accidental shootings.
76 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The Court in Belton held that when the occupants of an automobile are
validly arrested, police can search the passenger compartment of the vehicle and search inside any
containers found within the passenger compartment. Id at 459-61.
77 The Court stated:
[A]s one commentator has pointed out, the protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments "can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in
most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether
an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement."
Id at 458 (quoting LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures'" The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 142). The Court quoted LaFave extensively:
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring
the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuffupon
which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be "literally impos-
sible of application by the officer in the field."
1987] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
field continually have called for bright line decisions.78 Bright line stan-
dards should only be adopted in limited situations.7 9 The limited pat-
down search of an arrestee's companion is one of those situations.8 0
The doctrine would provide police officers with a bright line rule as
to when they could search companions. The automatic companion rule,
even though a bright line rule (which historically decreases a police of-
ficer's discretion), would allow police officers some discretion. An officer
would not have to frisk every companion-but he would have that op-
tion. He could protect his life by using his own discretion.8 1
453 U.S. at 458 (citation omitted).
See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (The Court noted that "a single,
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers .... "); Oberly, The Policeman's Duty and the Law
Pertaining to Citizen Encounters, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 653 (1981). Oberly writes:
Police officers throughout the United States have continuing contact with citizens in a wide
variety of circumstances, many of which are specifically associated with crime prevention
.... In this regard, it is of little assistance to decide narrow issues, which may stir spirited
debate among legal scholars, when the crime rate has soared since Teny was decided and
shows no sign of abatement.
Id at 681. Oberly also recognizes the need for police to take charge of a situation. "TI]he officer
should be permitted to temporarily freeze the situation for a short period of time to make the neces-
sary investigation of the suspect .. d.." I  at 685.
78 See Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. LJ.
329 (1973). The author posits that for the exclusionary rule to succeed, the law cannot be "tentative,
flexible and self-consciously oriented to facts." Id. at 365. Instead, the constitutional prohibition
"must be clear, unambiguous, not susceptible to quibbles or easy avoidance, and easily understanda-
ble by the persons sought to be deterred." Id. at 333.
79 Professor LaFave outlined four criteria that should be examined when considering the adop-
tion of a bright line rule:
(1) Does it have clear and certain boundaries, so that it in fact makes case-by-case evalua-
tion and adjudication unnecessary?
(2) Does it produce results approximating those which would be obtained if accurate case-
by-case application of the underlying principle was practicable?
(3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to forego case-by-case application of a principle
because that approach has proved unworkable?
(4) Is it not readily subject to manipulation and abuse?
LaFave, supra note 20, at 325-26 (emphasis in original).
80 The automatic companion rule passes as a bright line rule under these criteria. It certainly
has clear and certain boundaries: The limited pat-down search of an arrestee's companion is such a
boundary. See id. at 326 (using the Belton decision as an example of a bright line rule that does not
meet the first criteria). The automatic companion rule would produce results similar to a case-by-
case adjudication. This is evidenced by the fact that in both cases rejecting the automatic companion
rule, Bell and Flett, the search was upheld on Teny grounds. The case-by-case approach presently
used has proved unworkable. See LaFave, supra note 20, at 329 (The Robinson bright line makes sense
"because the only alternative is to impose on the police the burden of making exceedingly difficult
case-by-casejudgments, risking harm to themselves .... "). The absence of an automatic companion
rule imposes just such a burden. The fourth criteria is met because the threat of abuse and manipu-
lation is absent due to the fact that the suspect is arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant obtained
from a magistrate. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
81 See generally Pepinsky, Better Living Through Police Discretion, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249
(1984). Pepinsky finds that "discretion is a desirable part of policing." Id. The author also finds
that "non-discretionary ... law enforcement is inherently unjust." Id at 266. See also Moore &
Multz, Arrest, Stop, and Frisk, 9 CoLo. LAw. 646 (1980). The authors explain that the standard "ar-
ticulable suspicion" was never meant to hinder police conduct in tight situations where discretion
would most often be used:
The root function of the "articuable suspicions" requirement has not been to hamstring
officers facing dangerous street situations. Rather it has been to establish a basis for post-
hocjudicial review to insure that the weapons frisk is not used as a substitute for a search
incident to an arrest or as a means of evading normal warrant and probable cause require-
ments of the state and federal constitutions.
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Further guidance has been provided by the Model Rules of Stop and
Frisk, prepared by the Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemak-
ing, College of Law, Arizona State University in 1974.82 In addressing
the question of when a police officer has reasonable suspicion for a frisk,
the Model Rules adopted the following:
The following list contains some factors which-alone or in combina-
tion-may be sufficient to create reasonable suspicion for a frisk:
G) Companions. Has the officer detained a number of people at the
same time? Has a frisk of a companion of the suspect revealed a
weapon? Does the officer have assistance immediately available to
handle the number of persons he has stopped?83
Though the Model Rules, by speaking in terms of reasonable suspicion,
do not explicitly support an automatic companion rule, it is clear that the
Model Rules state that a guilty original suspect may be enough to create
reasonable suspicion of the companion. In the automatic companion
case, the reasonable suspicion is supplied by the fact that police have
probable cause that the suspect has committed a crime and is accompa-
nied by a potentially dangerous companion. The Model Rules would
support a frisk of companions in most situations.
C. Common Sense
Common sense also dictates adoption of the automatic companion
rule.8 4 Teny, in its holding, focused on the fact that the exclusionary
rule's purpose is deterrence; it should not be used "in futile protest
against practices which it can never be used effectively to control. ' '8 5 The
Court recognized that the exclusionary rule will not serve its purpose if
the police "have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo suc-
cessful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal." 86 That
other goal, in Terry and in a search involving an arrestee's companion, is
safety.8 7 In an automatic companion case, the police want custody of the
suspect who is named in the arrest warrant. They do not want the com-
panion, but they do want to preserve their safety and that of others in the
vicinity. Logically, then, they will "forgo successful prosecution" to pre-
serve this safety and proceed to search the companion. According to
Terry reasoning, such conduct would not be deterred by prohibiting an
automatic search of a companion.
Id Employment of the automatic companion rule does not provide an officer with the possibility of
evading "normal warrant and probable cause requirements." He must first arrest the suspect pursu-
ant to a valid arrest warrant before he can search the companion.
82 Reprinted in Oberly, supra note 77, at 658.
83 Id at 690-91 (emphasis added).
84 See supra note 36.
85 See supra note 21.
86 Id
87 See supra notes 20-22 & 68-75 and accompanying text.
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Those opposed to the automatic companion rule voice the concern
that police officers may abuse the privilege.8 This argument fails to ac-
knowledge the fact that the police already have an arrest warrant. They
have obtained a determination of probable cause by a "neutral and de-
tached magistrate."8 9 Police officers are not permitted to frisk just any-
one in this situation-it must be a companion of a suspect arrested
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the automatic
companion rule. However, the underlying rationale of cases related to
the issue is clear: To protect the police officer as much as possible.
Common sense and the need for a "bright line" standard also call for the
adoption of the rule. Historically,
[w]hen the level of intrusion into a citizen's privacy is substantially less
than that involved in an arrest or similar seizure, and where the need
to make the intrusion is based on an important state interest, the
Court, in the past, has upheld such intrusions as reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. 90
Terry recognized that a limited pat-down is less intrusive than a full
search and the important state interest of safety is evident when dealing
with an arrestee's companion. The automatic companion rule clearly
falls into the same category of other warrant clause exceptions and
should be adopted.
John J. O'Shea
88 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas feared that decisions like
Teny would "give the police greater power than a magistrate" and result in a "long step down the
totalitarian path." Id. at 38.
89 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
90 Joseph, supra note 55, at 103.
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